Imitation is ubiquitous in positive social interactions. For adult and child observers, it also supports inferences about the participants in such interactions and their social relationships, but the origins of these inferences are obscure. Do infants attach social significance to this form of interaction? Here we test 4-to 5.5-month-old infants' interpretation of imitation, asking if the imitative interactions they observe support inferences of social affiliation, across 10 experimental conditions that varied the modality of the imitation (movement vs. sound), the roles of specific characters (imitators vs. targets), the number of characters in the displays (3 vs. 5), and the number of parties initiating affiliative test events (1 vs. 2). These experiments, together with one experiment conducted with 12-month-old infants, yielded three main findings. First, infants expect that characters who engaged in imitation will approach and affiliate with the characters whom they imitated. Second, infants show no evidence of expecting that characters who were targets of imitation will approach and affiliate with their imitators. Third, analyzing imitative interactions is difficult for young infants, whose expectations vary in strength depending on the number of characters to be tracked and the number of affiliative actors to be compared. These findings have implications for our understanding of social imitation, and they provide methods for advancing understanding of other aspects of early social cognitive development.
Introduction
Human infants face the basic but critical task of learning about the social beings around them. Who is related to whom, and how? The task of learning about social beings may be especially difficult, because much social behavior-both gestures and speech-depends in part on arbitrary, conventional relations that must be learned (e.g., the words and hand gestures that signal the start of an interaction ["hi!"; a waving hand] and its end ["bye bye!" a flapping hand]). Some social behavior, however, relies not on the specifics of the actions but on the relationship between the social partners' behavior. One such behavior is the imitation, by one party, of another person's action. Imitation is a universal language for expressing social engagement, because one can only systematically imitate the behavior of another person if one is attending to that person. If the imitated behavior serves no clear instrumental function, moreover, then its performance suggests that the imitator is motivated not only to attend to the target of imitation but to align with the target for social or communicative purposes. Here we use studies of young human infants to probe the origins and nature of the social and communicative functions of imitation, asking how infants interpret imitative interactions they observe as third parties. Do young infants use patterns of imitative behavior to attribute social motives to the partners in that interaction? In particular, do infants attribute prosocial motives to imitators, expecting imitators to affiliate with the targets of their imitation?
Prosocial imitation and development
Adults often signal their attention to and understanding of another person's speech by imitating the person's words and intonation either directly ("OK, two espressos") or indirectly ("Copy that.") Even in the absence of such overt communicative motives, however, imitation and mimicry are common, spontaneous components of social interaction that both reflect and elicit liking and prosocial behavior in adults (Bernieri, 1988; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005) and children (Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 2011; Thelen, Dollinger, & Roberts, 1975) . Children and adults appear to use imitation and mimicry as social tools, as they increase their copying behavior in the presence of desirable social partners or when the threat of ostracism enhances the drive to affiliate
